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Abstract 
In this paper, we propose an alternative methodology to rank hospitals based on the choices of 
Medical Schools graduates over training vacancies. We argue that our measure of relative hospital 
quality has the following desirable properties: a) robustness to manipulation from the hospital's 
administrators; b) comprehensiveness in the scope of the services analyzed; c) inexpensive in 
terms of data requirements, and d) not subject to selection biases. Accurate measures of health 
provider quality are needed in order to establish incentive mechanisms, to assess the need for 
quality improvement, or simply to increase market transparency and competition. Public report 
cards in certain US states and the NHS ranking system in the UK are two attempts at constructing 
quality rankings of health care providers. Although the need for such rankings is widely 
recognized, the criticisms at these attempts reveal the difficulties involved in this task. Most 
criticisms alert to the inadequate risk-adjustment and the potential for perverse consequences such 
as patient selection. The recent literature, using sophisticated econometric models is capable of 
controlling for case-mix, hospital and patient selection, and measurement error. The detailed data 
needed for these evaluations is, however, often unavailable to researchers. In those countries, such 
as Spain, where there is neither public hospital rankings nor public data on hospital output 
measures such as mortality rates our methodology is a valid alternative. We develop this 
methodology for the Spanish case. In a follow-up paper we will present results using Spanish 
data. In Spain graduates choose hospital training vacancies in a sequential manner that depends on 
their average grade. Our framework relies on three assumptions. First, high quality hospitals 
provide high quality training. Second, graduates are well informed decision makers who are well 
qualified to assess hospital quality. Third, they prefer to choose a high quality vacancy rather than 
a low quality one ceteris paribus. If these assumptions hold, then the first physicians to choose are 
likely to grab the best vacancies while the ones who choose last are stuck with the worst available. 
Thus, it is possible to infer from physicans' choices quality differentials amongst hospitals. We 
model the physician's decision as a nested-logit a la McFadden. Unlike in standard applications of 
McFadden's model, in our application the choice set is not constant across physicians but it 
shrinks along the sequential hospital choice process  
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market. 
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1 Introduction
Assessing the quality of health care providers is a priority of many governments, state agencies, insurance
companies and often also patients. Accurate measures of provider quality are needed in order to establish
incentive mechanisms, to identify which ones need quality improvements, or simply to increase market
transparency and competition. Public report cards in certain US states and the NHS ranking system in
the UK are two attempts at constructing quality rankings of health care providers. Although the need
for such rankings is widely recognized, the number of criticisms at these attempts reveal the difficulties
involved in this task (see for example the review by Shahian et al., 2001 and the references therein).
Most criticisms alert to the inadequate risk-adjustment and the potential for strategic behavior among
providers, such as patient selection, induced by these rankings. Nonetheless, the available studies show
that there is a wide variation in the performance of health care providers (e.g. Shahian et al., 2001 and
Burgess et al., 2003) and that, in some cases, differences in providers have widened in the past decades
(e.g. McLellan and Staiger, 1999a).
Hospital quality assessment is particularly complex due to several reasons: First, hospitals produce
a wide range of heterogeneous services, which makes it impossible to deÞne hospital production in a
simple way (see, for instance, McClellan and Staiger, 1999b). Second, the randomness of hospital output,
e.g. because of small number of patients or uncommon conditions, and the existence of confounding
factors, such as location-speciÞc patient health characteristics, may lead to noisy measures of hospital
quality. Third, patient selection and other non-random sources of patients assignment (see, for instance,
Gowrisankaran and Town, 1999) will bias estimates of hospital quality. Finally, due to data collection
costs, there is a lack of follow-up measures of treatment results. In this paper we provide a methodology
to rank hospitals which is immune to these difficulties.
In many countries there is neither public hospital rankings nor public data on hospital output
measures such as mortality rates. Lacking this information, we propose to construct a relative hospital
quality measure using publicly available data on physicians choices over hospital vacancies at the
beginning of their specialized training. We adapt our methodology to the case of Spain. In Spain, after
graduation from medical school, physicians willing to start a career as a specialist must pass a national
exam. Conditional on passing the exam, they choose hospital training vacancies in a sequential manner
that depends on their grade.
Our methodology relies on three assumptions: Þrst, high quality hospitals provide high quality
training; second, physicians are well informed decision makers who are well qualiÞed to assess hospital
quality; third, all else equal, physicians prefer a higher quality vacancy. The latter assumption is
reasonable especially in this very competitive and tight labor market and can be justiÞed not only
because physicians receive a better training but also because it provides a signal to the post-training
market.1 If all three assumptions hold, physicians who choose Þrst are likely to grab the best vacancies
1Specialist certiÞcates, obtained after completing the training period, specify the hospital where the training took place.
The name of the training hospital is, therefore, used in the labor market as a signal of quality.
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while the ones who choose last are stuck with the worst vacancies available. We use the traditional
random utility framework to model the physicians choice among the vacancies available to her.
In short, we exploit the physicians sequence of hospital choices to infer quality differentials among
hospitals. Conditional on having enough observations, our methodology for measuring relative hospital
quality has the following desirable properties: a) robust to manipulation from the hospitals administra-
tion; b) it can be extended to allow for differences in quality across services within a hospital; c) inex-
pensive in terms of data requirements, and d) not subject to selection bias from patients (Gowrisankaran
and Town, 1999) nor hospital screening of patients. We expect property a) to hold because it should
not be possible for hospitals to inßuence physicians choices but through their performance.2 Property
b) follows because hospitals open vacancies in several specialties. Property c) is satisÞed because physi-
cians choices are routinely collected. Finally, our relative quality measure is not subject to selection
bias because it is neither based on the decisions of patients nor of hospitals.
When using physicians decisions to evaluate hospital quality three issues should be addressed. First,
physicians choices depend on personal as well as career considerations. For example, when choosing a
hospital physicians are simultaneously choosing place of residence. Second, the sequential structure of
the problem implies dependence across observations. As physicians gradually Þll in the vacancies, they
decrease the choice sets of remaining physicians. We propose a model similar in spirit to the sequence
of exploded conditional multinomial logit proposed by Bradlow and Fader (2001). Our model is then
extended, following McFaddens nested logit, to account for different patterns of substitutability across
hospitals in different locations. Finally, drawing from the informational cascades literature (see, for
example, Banerjee, 1992, and Allsopp and Hey, 1999) dependence may arise because the decisions from
previous physicians embody useful information regarding vacancies attractiveness.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the literature on hospital
evaluation. Section 3 sketches the underlying institutional background in Spain. Section 4 describes the
data set and speciÞcation strategies. Section 5 presents the econometric framework. Section 6 provides
some concluding comments. Finally, the Appendix contains Þgures and tables.
2 Literature Review
Early evaluations of hospital production were based on accounting exercises of the inputs used during
an average stay. As better data were made available, other hospital indicators, such as the length
of the average stay or the average turnover, were gradually incorporated in the studies. Yet, it soon
became clear that the use of such indicators could be easily inßuenced by hospital administrators so
2Besides hospital quality, one could also claim that physicians worry about tenure promotion. Physicians might tradeoff
quality for less future job uncertainty. Hospitals administrations could give assurances of future promotions to attract good
candidates. Since these promises would be unobserved, a way to control for the probability of getting a tenure position
in a given hospital would be to condition for the number of tenured physicians per number of beds, since this would be a
proxy for future openings.
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that improvements in the indicators were often associated with situations for which hospital quality
had not actually improved. This was considered a serious drawback for the practical usefulness of these
indicators. Ideally, quality measures should not be easily manipulated by the hospital administrators
(see for instance, Lu, 1999, for a description of this problem in the context of substance abuse treatment).
More recently, some studies have used treatment results, such as mortality rates, to assess hospital
quality after controlling for observable characteristics. For instance, Normand et al. (1997) compare
mortality rates for acute myocardial infarction after using hospital and patient characteristics as risk-
adjusters. At least two difficulties may still arise. First, since the patients true health status is
not reßected in just one binary indicator, such as a imminent survival, the results are necessarily a
partial analysis of hospital quality. Recent studies have tried to address this limitation by incorporating
additional health measures over time (see, for instance, McClellan and Staiger, 1999a, 1999b, and
Ackerberg, Machado and Riordan, 2006). Nonetheless, the potential for biased estimates of hospital
quality due to insufficient gathering of relevant health information remains. The obvious solution to
this problem, i.e. the exhaustive gathering of information regarding treatment results, does not seem
practical as data collection costs could increase substantially.
The second difficulty with simple risk-adjustment is that it fails to adjust for non-observable factors.
For example, Gowrisankaran and Town (1999) as well as McLellan and Staiger (1999a) argue that
the endogeneity in the process of patients assignment to hospitals is a source of bias when estimating
hospital quality because the best hospitals will usually be assigned the most severe cases. Gowrisankaran
and Town propose a simple linear instrumental variables approach to the mortality rate model using
distances to non-selected hospitals as instruments of hospital choice to deal with the endogeneity but,
they caution, their method is not appropriate to construct a ranking of hospitals due to the high
standard deviations of the estimated hospital-dummy coefficients. McLellan and Staiger, on the other
hand, decide to restrict their analyses to heart attack patients who have less of a possibility to choose
hospitals due to the urgency of treatment. Geweke, Gowrisankaran and Town (2002) go one step further
and jointly model the hospital choice and the mortality outcome for Medicare patients suffering from
pneumonia. They compute the probability of mortality under the hypothetical experiment of random
admission to hospitals using bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation techniques. In a somewhat
different vein, Ackerberg et. al. (2006) address the problem of endogeneity in their study on alcoholism
treatment by distinguishing between the intrinsic quality of the health provider and the effect of the
patients unobservable characteristics in the assignment to health providers.
In contrast to the previous studies where patient level data are used, we use public data on physicians
choices over training vacancies at the beginning of their careers. Thus, our proposal relies on a revealed
preference argument in the labor market for training vacancies. Avery et al. (2004) use a similar
argument to rank colleges in the United States, however, our methodologies and applications differ in
several ways. First, Avery et al. (2004) acknowledge a potential self-selection problem that would bias
their ranking results. In their application, students choice sets are not exogenous, instead they are
a subset of colleges pre-selected by the students. In the Spanish case, choices sets are given for each
physician. Second, their methodology hinges on the availability of exogenous and precisely recorded
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students place of residence. As we argue below, this is not the case for the Spanish data. Hence, we
extend the basic framework to address the endogeneity issue.
3 The labor market for specialists
In Spain, it is mandatory for medical school graduates to complete training programs in hospitals
during a number of years before they can practice as specialist physicians. Not all hospitals open
training vacancies. Hospitals must fulÞll certain requirements before they can open training vacancies.
These requirements are established by the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health. The
number of vacancies in each hospital is determined by the government after consultation with hospital
administrators and depends on the hospital training capacity and the needs of the population in the
surrounding area. In conversations with government officials involved in the process we were told
hospitals seek to obtain as many vacancies as they can manage as an inexpensive way of Þlling their
personnel needs. Wages for training positions are the same across all hospitals. The data suggest that
given hospital size, the number of vacancies is unrelated to hospital quality.3
Overall, according to data from the National Catalogue of Hospitals, only around 22% of health care
providers are part of the training programs for specialists. These providers share a number of features.
All of them are hospitals and, on average, larger than those institutions which do not train specialists.
Training hospitals have, on average, 540 beds as opposed to an average of 117 beds for those hospitals
without training vacancies. In addition, training hospitals have special health care equipment, such as
extracorporeal shock wave lithotripsy, cobalt treatment equipment, and particle accelerators. Nearly
75% of training hospitals report at least one type of special equipment while the Þgure for non-training
hospitals is only 36%. The percentage of private and public hospitals that open training vacancies are
4.65% and 43%, respectively. These statistics suggest that the sample of training hospitals includes a
large proportion of the most important hospitals in the Spanish health care system.
Hospitals open vacancies in different specialties. Across all hospitals, the total number of vacancies
per specialty-year is very unequal.
The match between physicians and vacancies follows a serial dictator procedure. First, physicians are
ranked according to an average score, which is obtained as a weighted average between a standardized
national exam score4 with a weight of 75% and the medical school grade-point-average  with
a weight of 25%. Every year the number of physicians who pass the exam is higher than the total
3The number of training vacancies is highly correlated (0.83) with the number of beds, a proxy for hospital size. On
the other hand, in a regression of the number of training vacancies per hospital on its lagged value, the number of beds,
and the lagged proxy for hospital quality (the rank of the Þrst candidate who chooses that hospital) shows that the latter
is not signiÞcant. This suggests that the order in which physicians choose each hospital does not affect the number of
training vacancies per hospital during our sample period.
4The standardized national exam is called the MIR exam after the Spanish acronym for in-hospital resident physician.
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number of vacancies available.5 Physicians may choose a vacancy following the sequence established by
the rank. Some physicians, however, decide to drop out from the process. Most of these have a low
rank which indicates that they prefer an outside option to the vacancies still available to them (e.g.
Gonzalez, 2004). Conditional on choosing a vacancy, physicians dominant strategy is to choose their
best option from those still available.6
4 Data
In the follow-up paper we plan to use several data sets. The main dataset contains the sequence
of hospital-specialty choices made by physicians candidates from 1995-2000. These data are publicly
available from the Spanish Ministry of Health and contain information on physician characteristics such
as her position in the queue, gender, self-reported province of residence, college where she graduated,
and her hospital-specialty choice.
As mentioned in the previous Section, physicians may drop out from the process and choose their
outside option. We can identify the rank of those individuals who drop out from the process, however
there is neither information on any of their other characteristics nor on their outside option. Therefore,
we model the physicians choice as a two-part model reßecting both the decision of choosing either the
outside option or one of the available vacancies.
During our sample period either military or social services is compulsory for males. Individuals may
comply with the compulsory service during their student years or delay it up to a limit. Physicians who
decide to join the service just before their specialist training have the right to reserve a vacancy and
Þll it after service completion. Because these physicians do not Þll the vacancy immediately, physicians
who follow in the queue will Þll it. This means that the set of vacancies available is not affected by
reservations. We are unable to deal properly with male physicians headed to the compulsory service.
From 1995-1997 the data do not include the reservations during these years which implies a loss of
information. The absence of these reservations will not result in a bias as long as there is enough
heterogeneity in the hospitals chosen by reservists. We do not expect the bias to be signiÞcant given
that the number of reservations is always less than 6, 7% a year. During 1998-2000 the data includes
the reservations but we are not able to identify them, causing two potential problems. First, it could
be argued that because the number of vacancies in hospital-specialty combinations chosen by reservists
is artiÞcially increased, i.e. is endogenous, it could bias results. This reasoning is wrong because what
is relevant for physicians choices is the set of available hospital-specialty combinations. Second, as
5According to the Curso Intensivo Mir http://www.curso-mir.com/nuestros_result/06.htm the excess of physicians over
vacancies during the last years ßuctuated between 19% and 78% of the vacancies.
6González (2004) claims that before 1996 some physicians chose from the available set any specialty in the hospital they
wished to be located with the aim of requesting a change of specialty once the training period started. She also argues that
regulation put in place in 1995 stopped these short-cuts by making it very costly to change specialties. We believe this
strategic effect which, if at all, is only present in the 1995 data could only bias the hospital coefficients for those hospitals
where switching specialties during training is perceived by the physician candidates to be easier.
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reservists cannot choose an outside option, the set of choices for them is different than the one for other
physicians. We do not expect this problem to be severe as the number of reservations has most likely
decreased in these years due to the announcement of the abolishment of the compulsory service by 2001.
The main dataset has around 2, 845 vacancies each year totalling 16, 977 observations from 1995−
2000, after applying several Þlters to control for misspelling in the coding of the hospital or the specialty.7
The total number of hospitals in the data set is around 175. This number varies by year because some
hospitals are merged and others are split into several ones during the period under analysis. We treat
hospitals resulting from either merges or divisions as new hospitals.8
Typically, for a particular hospital-specialty combination a very small number of vacancies is offered.
Of all hospital-specialty combinations available, roughly 84% correspond to a single vacancy being
offered and in 95% of the cases the number of vacancies is smaller than three, as the next Þgure
illustrates:
84.09
10.8
2.841 1.705 .5682
0
50
10
0
15
0
Pe
rc
en
t
1 2 3 4 5
 
median=1.50 and mean=1.30
Average number of vacancies per specialty per hospital
The average number of vacancies per hospital (over all specialties) per year is 18.14 but this distri-
bution is very disperse and skewed as the next Þgure shows:
7After 1996 physicians who wished to become General Practitioners participated in a separate process which included
a different exam and a different selection mechanism. This mechanism run parallel to the other specialties. For this reason
and because GP is a non-hospital based specialty we decided not to consider these cases.
8The year with the lowest number of hospitals is 1995 with 144 while the year with the highest number is 2000 with
158.
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However, the average number of different specialties offered at each hospital-year is on average
relatively large (10.68).
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The specialties in our sample are unevenly represented as the following Þgure shows:
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In addition, there is a marked contrast between the distribution of male and female physician across
specialties. Figure 1 shows the deviation of the female share by specialty to the overall female share in
percentage terms. This index will be close to zero whenever the female share in a given specialty is close
to the overall female share (58.6 percent) as is the case for Emergency Medicine. The most striking
feature of Figure 1 is the large dispersion of female shares by specialty. For 27 out of 41 specialties,
female shares deviate from the mean by more than 10 percent. At one extreme of the distribution are
Pediatrics, Allergist, and Obstetrics & Gynecology (O&G) where female shares exceed by more than 30
percent the overall average. At the other extreme, we Þnd Urology, Neurological Surgery, Cardiovascular
Surgery, and Orthopaedic Surgery where the percentage of female is lower than the average by more
than 50 percent.
From the information available in the physicians data set it is possible to construct a variable which
reßects a notion of geographical proximity between the physicians residence and each of the hospitals.
Whereas the hospitals exact address is available, there are, however, two problems with the physicians
declared residence. First, physicians only declare the province of residence, not the city. Second, we
believe this variable is not measured in a consistent way. Physicians who study where their parents live,
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Figure 1: Gender segregation by specialty
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declare their residence in a consistent way.9 In contrast, among the physicians who study in a different
province from their parents, some declare their parents residence as their own (these represent 14%
of physicians in our sample) while, as we argue below, others declare the province where their college
is located. We think that this inconsistency is not random. Studying in a good college enhances the
likelihood of attaining a high score in the MIR exam. Consequently, good students, who aim to be
trained at a top hospital, are more likely to move from their parents home to study at a good college.
Hence, the physicians province of residence is not only measured inconsistently but this inconsistency
is likely correlated with the students ability and her ranking. Alternatively, it may be argued that
there is no such inconsistency because the declared province of residence reßects intended location and,
therefore, would be correct to use it as the physicians location.
As an illustration of these issues consider the cases of Madrid and Barcelona, the two most populated
provinces in Spain. Both Madrid and Barcelona act as focal points for medical students from other parts
of the country. As can be seen from the statistics in Table 1, the percentage of the overall college student
population in Madrid over the total national (22.13%) is considerably higher than the percentage of
citizens under 18 years of age over the total national (12.99%), which shows that Madrids universities
attract students from the rest of the country. The same phenomenon is partly observed in our data
where 17.32 percent of physicians graduated in Madrid. This number is very close to the percentage
of physicians in the sample who declare Madrid as their province of residence (18.10%). Therefore,
the variable province of residence in our data shows Madrid as a focal point. In contrast, although
the percentage of college population in Barcelona is also higher than the percentage of minors (14.18%
versus 10.94%), the percentage who declare Barcelona as their province of residence in our sample
(10.75%) is not higher than the percentage of minors living in Barcelona (10.94%). This suggests that
while almost all students who went to study in Madrid declare Madrid as their province of residence,
those who went to study in Barcelona still consider their parents as their own residence.
% Province % College Population % Population under 18
of Residencea Samplea Census 2001b Census 2001b
(medical schools) (all colleges)
Barcelona 10.75 11.54 14.18 10.94
Madrid 18.10 17.32 22.13 12.99
aData from the physicians data set.
bData from the Spanish National Statistics Office (INE).
Table 1: Percentage of populations in Barcelona and Madrid over total national
To circumvent the problem of inconsistency and the potential biases associated with the residence
location variable we also use the location of the college where the physician studied. This variable has
9Using data from the European Community Household Panel for the years of study, in Spain around 80% of college
students live in their parents residence.
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the advantage of being precisely measured. Nonetheless, since declared residence may be interpreted as
intended location we will show results based on both college as well as residence location.
Tables 3 and 4 in the Data Appendix show that physicians mostly choose hospitals in their college
location (Table 3) or in their declared place of residence (Table 4). The preference to stay in the same
region will be introduced in our model in the form of nests a la McFadden. The simplest speciÞcation
has two nests. A hospital is in nest 1 when it is located in the same region as the college (residence) and is
in nest 2 when it is located in any other region. We may use two deÞnitions of region: the administrative
division of the country (Comunidades Autónomas)10, and travel-time-to-work region, which allows a
more ßexible deÞnition of nests.11 Using the data on travel time, a hospital is classiÞed into nest 1
whenever it is located within reasonable commuting time, say 45 minutes, from the physicians college
(residence) location. With this new deÞnition, the classiÞcation of hospitals into nest 1 and nest 2
remains the same for 89 percent of the observations with respect to the administrative division of the
country; for 9 percent of the observations, the classiÞcation changes from nest 1 to nest 2, reßecting the
fact that in several administrative regions some hospitals are located beyond the 45-minute commuting
time limit.
Nests based on geographical proximity variables play an important role in the identiÞcation of
hospital quality because part of the identiÞcation comes precisely from those physicians who choose a
hospital which is not in their province of residence. Physicians who are highly ranked will have more
options and, therefore, a movement to another province reveals a stronger preference for the chosen
hospital. On the contrary, physicians who are lower ranked may have to move to another province
because there are fewer options to choose from. Therefore, those movements made by highly ranked
physicians are central to identify hospital quality.
The second data source is the Spanish National Catalogue of Hospitals (Catálogo Nacional de Hos-
pitales), which is published annually by the Ministry of Health. These data contains hospital character-
istics such as location (city), number of beds (usually used as a proxy for hospital size), type of hospital
(e.g. in our sample: general purpose (81%), and psychiatric (7%)), ownership (e.g. in our sample: public
(86%), private non-for-proÞt (8%), or private for-proÞt (6%)), the corresponding regional authority, and
some information about the available technical equipment (e.g. in our sample: emission tomography
equipment75% of hospitals have at least one, and hemodynamic monitoring equipment22% of
hospitals have at least one).
Third, we also gathered annual average housing prices at provincial level from the Spanish National
Statistics Office (INE) to control for regional differences in living costs.
10Spain is composed of 52 provinces. These are grouped into 17 larger administrative regions denominated Autonomous
Communities.
11We use a similar dataset to the one used in Holl (2004) on travel time between college and hospital locations at the
city level to construct a measure of geographical proximity.
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5 The Econometric Framework
5.1 The Basic Model
In this section we propose the framework to construct a ranking of hospitals based on individual choices
made by recently graduated physicians. In this subsection we simplify the decision model by assuming
that geographical proximity to hospital plays no role in the physicians decision and that physicians must
choose one of the available vacancies. Subsection 5.2 will extend the model to incorporate location, and
in subsection 5.3 we will allow for outside options.
In our data set, physicians are ordered according to their average score. Let i = 1, ...N simultaneously
identify a physician as well as her position in the data. For example, i = 1 (i = N) denotes the Þrst (last)
observation in the data which corresponds to the physician who obtained the highest (lowest) score.
Each physician i chooses one hospital-specialty combination from those available to her. Hospitals
may open more than one vacancy for a given specialty. Denote by Ci the set of all hospital-specialty
combinations available to physician i. If i chooses a hospital-specialty combination for which there are at
least two remaining vacancies then i+1s choice set is identical to Ci. Eventually, however, as hospital-
specialty vacancies are exhausted, choice sets must shrink: C1 contains all possible hospital-specialty
vacancies and CN has a single vacancy available. Hence, choice sets satisfy the following:
Ci ⊇ Ci0 for i0 > i. (1)
We model physician preferences according to the stochastic random utility model where Uij repre-
sents the utility to physician i from selecting hospital-specialty combination j. Uij is decomposed into
a deterministic component Vij and a iid stochastic term εij :
Uij = Vij + εij (2)
where εij is assumed to follow an extreme value distribution, i.e. Pr(εij ≤ x) = exp(− exp(−x)).
McFadden (1974) shows that the probability that physician i chooses the hospital-specialty combination
j∗ ∈ Ci is given by:
Pij∗ =
exp(Vij∗)X
j∈Ci
exp(Vij)
, for j∗ = 1, ..., Ji (3)
where Ji denotes the number of elements in Ci.
Let π = (π1, ...πN) be the observed sequence of physician choices where πi indexes the hospital-
specialty combination chosen by physician i. The assumption of iid error terms implies that the prob-
ability of observing a given sequence of hospital-specialty choices, Pr(π), is a sequence of independent
multinomial logit models:
Pr(π) = Pr(U1π1 ≥ U1j |∀j ∈ C1)× Pr(U2,π2 ≥ U2j |∀j ∈ C2)
×...× Pr(UN−1,πN−1 ≥ UN−1j |∀j ∈ CN−1) (4)
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Equation (4) is analytically equivalent to the exploding conditional multinomial logit of Chapman
and Staelin (1982) and Bradlow and Fader (2001).12 Since physicians choose their preferred hospital-
specialty combination from their choice set Ci, the sequence of observed hospital-specialties choices π
provides useful information to construct a ranking of hospital-specialties combinations.
Physician preferences over hospital-specialty combinations depend on interactions of hospital-specialty
characteristics and individual characteristics. We assume that Vij depends linearly on a vector xh of
hospital characteristics, a vector zs of specialty characteristics, and Þnally on a vector yihs of interactive
variables relating physician i to hospital-specialty j:
Uij = xhβh + zsβs + yihsβhs + εij. (5)
In a simple speciÞcation of the basic model, the vector xh in (5) contains only hospital dummy variables,
zs contains specialty dummies, and yihs is an interaction term between physicians gender and specialty
chosen. The motivation for the latter is taken from the pattern of segregation between female and male
specialty choices described in the Data Section.
In order to construct an appropriate hospital ranking we need to infer from the physicians choices
a measure of the hospitals intrinsic quality. The estimates of the hospital dummy coefficients, βh,
provide a reasonable approximation for a measure of the latter. Nevertheless, two shortcomings should
be acknowledged: Þrst, hospital quality may vary across specialties. This issue could, in theory, be
addressed by including hospital-specialty dummy variables. For some specialties and hospitals, however,
there are not enough observations to obtain precise estimates. The assumption that hospital quality is
constant across specialties can be checked by estimating the model for a subset of specialties for which
there are enough observations. Second, there are alternative interpretations of the βhs. By intrinsic
quality we understand the unobserved component of hospital quality that stems from the proÞciency
of its management and staff.13,14 Most likely the estimated βhs capture not only intrinsic quality but
also other hospital characteristics with little time variation in our sample. For example, physicians may
prefer to be placed in a larger hospital because they may learn more. Hence, if we do not control for
size, the estimated βhs for larger hospitals would be an upward-biased estimate of quality. In order
to minimize this potential bias we should control for hospital observable characteristics such as the
availability of sophisticated equipment.
12Our model, however, is intrinsically different. In our case, the ranking π is obtained from the choice of different
individuals. Each physician chooses one option only and does not provide a complete ranking of hospital-specialties. In
constrast, Chapman and Staelins (1982) model assumes that each individual in the data set provides a ranking of choices.
Bradlow and Fader (2001) data, on the other hand, consists of weekly observations of the pop songs hit list Billboard
Hot 100. Their ranking is provided by the level of record sales and, therefore, implicitly aggregate the choice of many
different individuals. They do not model or mention the aggregation aspect of their data but instead work as if a single
entity, society, chooses the ranking.
13McLellan and Staiger (1999a) Þnd that hospital characteristics such as teaching institutions, for-proÞt organization,
number of beds, and volume cannot explain all the differences in standardized mortality rates. This suggests that unob-
servables such as intrinsic quality may explain them.
14 Ideally, one should control for unobserved heterogeneity. However, given the large number of available vacancies in
our data set, we decided for computational reasons not to extend the model to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity.
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The Likelihood function for the basic model takes the form:
L(π|β) = Pr(π) =
NY
i=1
exp(Vij∗(Xij;β))X
j∈Ci
exp(Vij(Xij ;β))
(6)
where Xij is the set of explanatory variables, and β the vector of parameters. An important drawback
from this model is that it requires the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) to hold.
5.2 Introducing Location
When physicians choose a particular hospital they are implicitly choosing their residence for the following
four to Þve years. Physicians have a preference to stay in the region where they graduated or reside.
If physicians decided upon location randomly then, for example, the percentage of physicians from
Madrid, the region with the highest number of vacancies, who choose to stay in Madrid should be on
average equal to the percentage number of vacancies in Madrid (24%). Yet, Tables 3 and 4 in the
Data Appendix show that the Þgure for Madrid is 83 percent well above the prediction of the random
location. For other regions the percentages are between 24.82 and 89.37 percent. These statistics suggest
that hospital-in-same-region as college (residence) is an important hospital characteristic affecting the
physicians choice. Interestingly, Table 2 shows that the higher the rank of the physician, the more
likely she is to stay in the same region.
At Þrst, Table 2s statistics are counter-intuitive since one expects the highest ranked physicians to
give a higher weight to hospital quality and, therefore, to be more willing to move to a different region
in order to be trained at a better hospital. There are two possible explanations for the numbers in Table
2. The Þrst one lies on a clustering argument whereby neither college nor hospital quality are evenly
distributed across the country but are instead concentrated in the same regions. In the presence of
clustering, top ranked students want to move to study medicine in the best colleges in order to increase
their position in the MIR ranking. Since the best colleges are located in the same regions as the best
hospitals then physicians do not need to move again for specialized training. Under this explanation the
hospital-in-same-region-as-college variable is endogenous since unobserved factors that affect hospital
choice also affect college location. For this reason, the introduction of hospital-in-same-region as college
(residence) in the physicians utility, equation (5), would lead to biased estimates. The nested-logit
framework presented below allows us to introduce this preference for proximity without causing a bias
in the estimated coefficients.
The second explanation for the statistics in Table 2 lies in the existence of high moving costs. In
this case, only the top ranked physicians would Þnd enough vacancies in their region to choose from
while the lowest ranked must take whatever is left.
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Rank quantiles
25% 25%− 50% 50%− 75% 75%− 100%
hospital in same region as college 74.11 73.38 67.51 55.73
hospital in same region as residence 76.00 76.90 71.12 59.26
Table 2: Percentage of Physicians in each quantile that choose a hospital in the same region as college
or residence
Figure 2 shows the percentage of students from each region that are ranked amongst the top 25
percent.15 The students from the best performing region fare roughly 50 percent better than those
students coming from the worse performing region. If the same analysis is performed for the students
in the top 50 percent, the differences between the best performing region and the worst are still large
(30 percent).
On the one hand, data from Þgure 2 suggest that college quality is not evenly distributed across the
country, on the other hand, the high moving costs explanation goes against the evidence that Madrid
and Barcelona attract a large number of students from other regions (Table 1). To summarize, the
clustering hypothesis seems a more plausible explanation for the statistics in Table 2.
We introduce location by extending the multinomial logit framework to a nested logit (McFadden,
1978) where the physicians hospital-specialty choice implicitly involves a location choice. Although
the choice of location and hospital-specialty is simultaneous, the nested logit can be interpreted as a
sequential choice model where one Þrst chooses a nest and then a hospital-specialty within that nest.16
In contrast to the multinomial logit, in the nested logit IIA only holds within nests. The ratio of choice
probabilities of any two hospitals-specialty combinations in the same nest is independent of all other
alternatives within that nest but the ratio between combinations from different nests depends on the
alternatives on those nests.
We partition the set of all hospital-specialty combinations available for each physician i into two
nests, Bik, k = 1, 2.Without loss of generality, nest 1 includes hospitals located close to the physicians
location (college or residence) while nest 2 includes hospitals located elsewhere. Thus, nests are deÞned
as an interaction between hospital and physician locations.
As in the previous Section, choice sets, Ci, are individual speciÞc and shrink as hospital-specialty
combinations are exhausted along the process. The physicians utility from choosing alternative j
belonging to nest k, j ∈ Bik ⊂ Ci, is:
Uij = Vij + εij (7)
15We dropped from Figure 2 the regions with only one college to comply with a conÞdentiality agreement. The range
for the excluded regions is similar to the range shown in Figure 2.
16Conceivably we could extend this framework to the hospital-specialty choice with a three-level nested logit where
locations and specialties deÞne nests. This would be a more general model than the one we propose here. However, given
the high number of specialties, the number of parameters would become computationally burdensome.
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where Vij depends linearly on a vector xh of hospital characteristics, a vector zs of specialty character-
istics, and Þnally on a vector yhsi of interactive variables relating physician i to hospital-specialty hs
just as in equation (5). The difference with the multinomial model lies in the distribution of the error
term, which now depends on the deÞnition of nests. To be precise, the vector εi = (εi1, ...εij , ...εiJ) has
cumulative distribution:
Pr(εi ≤ x) = exp
− 2X
k=1
 2X
j∈Bik
e
− xj
λk
λk
 . (8)
If λk = 1 for all k then the εis are independently distributed and the model coincides with the multino-
mial logit. Values of λk < 0 are not consistent with utility maximization.17 The parameter λk is a
measure of the degree of independence among the εis in nest k (see for example Train, 2003, pp 83).
Less independence between options in the same nests (lower value λk) increases differences in choice
probabilities across vacancies within nest k . Intuitively, the higher the correlation between the unob-
served components of utility for different options the more often the same hospitals are winners or
losers for different physicians.
It can be shown (McFadden, 1974) that the probability that physician i chooses the hospital-specialty
combination j∗ ∈ Bik ⊂ Ci is given by:
Pij∗ =
e
Vij∗
λk
X
j∈Bk
e
Vij
λk
λk−1
2X
l=1
X
j∈Bl
e
Vij
λl
λl
, for j∗ ∈ Bik (9)
The difference λ1 − λ2 measures the relative preference for nest 1. This can be seen in a simple
example. Suppose both nests have the same number of vacancies, N, and Vij = V for all i and j. Then
the probability of choosing any vacancy in nest 1 relative to the probability of choosing any vacancy
in nest 2 equals N (λ1−λ2). In our data, we expect λ1 to be close to 1 and λ2 < 1 implying that the
valuation of a vacancy in nest 1 relative to one in nest 2 is independent of alternatives in nest 1 but
may depend on alternatives in nest 2.18 In other words, for λ1 = 1, a lower value of λ2 increases the
probability of choosing any hospital in nest 1 vis-a-vis any hospital in nest 2 and simultaneously widens
17Train (2003) explains that values of λk ∈ (0, 1] are always consistent with utility maximizing behavior while λk > 1 is
consistent only for a range of values of the independent variables Xs.
18For any candidate i, if λ1 = 1 and λ2 < 1 the odds ratio of an alternative in nest 1 relative to an alternative in nest 2
is:
eVij∗
e
Vij
λ2
!"
j∈B2
e
Vij
λ2
#λ2−1
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the differences in probability ratios between hospitals in nest 2, i.e. hospitals in nest 2 are perceived as
less substitutable. Analogously, a high value of λ1 implies that alternatives in nest 1 are seen as more
substitutable, which is intuitive since proximity to hospitals is a crucial factor in the physicians choice.
Importantly, the nested-logit model allows us to introduce preference for proximity without causing a
bias in the estimated coefficients. To see this, note that the proximity variable, which deÞnes individual-
speciÞc nests, does not affect the deterministic component of utility directly, i.e. is not included in Vij ,
and only affects the distribution of the error term εi.19
The existence of clustering, irrespectively of moving costs, can be tested in our framework by rees-
timating the model for a subsample of top ranked physicians. If college quality were evenly distributed
across all regions then college region would be regarded as predetermined and uncorrelated with the
MIR rank. In other words, the student population of any two regions would be ranked similarly in the
MIR process. This would imply that λ1 − λ2 would only reßect the relative preference for nest 1 but
should not vary with the restriction of the sample to the highly ranked physicians. On the other hand
if clustering exists, i.e. the best hospitals are located in the same region as the best colleges, we would
expect higher values for λ1 − λ2 when we restrict the sample to the top ranked physicians. On the
contrary, if the best hospitals are located in different regions from the best colleges then, restricting the
sample to the top ranked should lead to a lower λ1−λ2 i.e. a preference to move to a different region.20
5.3 Introducing the Outside Option
As explained in Sections 3 and 4 physicians have the option of dropping out from the process, i.e. not
choosing any of the vacancies in their choice set. We can identify the rank of dropouts from the process,
however there is neither information on any of their other characteristics nor on their outside option.
In the previous Sections, the econometric model does not include an outside option. As long as the
odds ratio between any two hospital-specialty combinations does not depend on the individuals outside
option, maximizing the likelihood conditional on choosing a vacancy should give consistent estimates
of the parameters in Pij∗ . This result holds if the probability of choosing an outside option does not
depend on the quality of the hospitals available in the choice set. However we Þnd that the probability
of choosing an outside option decreases with the physicians order in the queue. As the next Þgure shows
for the year 2000, for example, the percentage of dropouts among the top 3000 physicians is only 8.5
percent while this percentage jumps to 38 percent for the top 5000.
The previous graph suggests that the probability of choosing an outside option may depend on the
19Avery et al. (2004) introduce the same-region-as-residence variable as a component of Vij in their model of college
choice. This speciÞcation causes them no bias since, in their data, the location of residence is precisely measured and
exogenous.
20We also expect both λ1, λ2 to increase in a restricted sample because there are more options and correlation between
vacancies should decrease.
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quality of the hospitals available. Hence a physician chooses her outside option iff:
Ui0 > max
j∈Ci
{Uij} (10)
where Ui0 denotes physician is utility derived from her outside option. One possibility would be to view
the outside option just as another vacancy. The difficulty with this approach is the lack of information
about the location of each physicians outside option. Given that physicians prefer to stay close to their
college or residence, we assume that physicians best outside option is always located in nest 1.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose an alternative methodology to rank hospitals based on the choices of Medical
Schools graduates over training vacancies. We model the physicians decision as a nested-logit a la
McFadden that takes into account preferences for geographical location. Unlike in standard applications
of McFaddens model, in our application the choice set is not constant across physicians but it shrinks
along the sequential hospital choice process.
The dataset used in this paper and in the follow-up paper has a number of speciÞcities such as
physicians who dropout from the process and decide not to take any vacancy from those available as
well as potential measurement error in the residence location information. Although important for our
particular application, none of these problem affects the validity of our methodology and its practical
usefulness.
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7 Data Appendix
In this appendix we give some of the statistical evidence that guided some of the speciÞcation choices
made. In particular the next table shows that most people choose a vacancy in the same region as
their college. Each column represents a college location, so for example 79.05 percent of the students
that graduated in Andalucian colleges choose a hospital located in Andalucia. The numbers in diagonal
represent the percentage of physicians who choose a hospital in the same region as their college.
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Table 3: Distribution of hospital location by region of college
College →
Hosp ita l ↓ And Ara Can CL Cat Val Mad
And 79.05 1.52 1.92 1.94 0.79 1.34 1.47
Ara 0.14 56.53 0.24 1.37 1.48 0.45 0.65
Ast 0.10 0.38 0.48 4.68 0.23 0.26 0.34
Bal 0.20 2.15 1.20 0.65 2.22 1.21 0.38
Can 1.43 0.38 77.94 1.13 0.42 0.90 0.51
Cant 0.24 1.27 0.72 3.63 0.09 0.32 0.41
CM 1.50 1.77 0.24 1.61 0.09 2.75 5.16
CL 1.16 1.65 0.00 46.77 0.69 0.58 2.43
Cat 1.70 12.67 6.95 3.63 89.37 6.91 2.05
Val 1.36 3.17 2.16 2.18 1.39 75.06 1.06
Ext 1.50 0.13 0.00 1.21 0.18 0.26 0.34
Gal 0.34 0.38 0.24 2.18 0.51 0.19 0.82
Mad 9.33 11.15 6.71 26.21 2.03 5.56 83.01
Mur 1.36 0.38 0.96 0.40 0.23 3.58 0.48
Nav 0.48 4.56 0.00 1.05 0.14 0.38 0.65
PV 0.07 0.25 0.24 1.13 0.14 0.19 0.17
R 0.03 1.65 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.06 0.07
Tota l 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Table 4: Distribution of hospital location by region of residence
Residence →
Hosp ital ↓ And Ara Can CL Cat Val Mad
And 79.82 0.761 2.37 1.58 0.60 1.17 1.93
Ara 0.10 66.21 0.22 1.97 1.49 0.49 0.67
Ast 0.14 0.00 0.43 5.13 0.09 0.00 0.27
Bal 0.27 0.30 1.08 0.16 0.88 0.80 0.30
Can 1.39 0.46 76.34 0.87 0.46 1.05 0.40
Cant 0.31 0.91 0.43 3.71 0.05 0.31 0.43
CM 1.36 1.37 0.22 1.03 0.05 1.73 4.10
CL 1.12 1.37 0.43 48.26 0.56 0.56 2.20
Cat 1.80 12.79 5.81 3.63 92.11 7.53 2.33
Val 1.19 2.28 1.72 2.13 0.70 76.30 0.97
Ext 1.46 0.15 0.00 0.87 0.14 0.25 0.30
Gal 0.37 0.00 0.00 2.76 0.32 0.25 0.67
Mad 8.61 9.74 8.17 24.80 1.86 4.75 83.78
Mur 1.29 0.15 1.08 0.24 0.23 3.70 0.37
Nav 0.71 2.89 0.86 1.74 0.37 0.86 1.00
PV 0.07 0.15 0.86 0.87 0.09 0.19 0.23
R 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.06 0.07
Tota l 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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